In this paper, we study the distortions to industrial organization caused by entr y regulation We take advantage of heterogeneity across industries in their natural barriers and growth opportunities to examine whether some industries are differentially affected in countries with high levels of entry regulation. First, we consider the effect of entry regulation on the (static) structure of industry. We find that in industries with high natural barriers to entry, as proxied by firm turnover in the U.S., entry regulation has little impact on the quantity and average size of firms in an industry. By contrast, in industries with low natural entry barriers, countries with high entry regulation have few, large firms, relative to less regulated economies. We find no relation between natural entry barriers and overall industry share of manufacturing, as a function of entry regulation. Second, utilizing firm-level data, we show that operating margins are relatively high in low barrier industries in high entry regulation countries (relative to high 'natural' barrier industries). Finally, we examine the impact of entry regulation on industry dynamics, by analyzing the ability of industries to take advantage of shocks to growth opportunities, and find that in countries with high entry regulation, industries respond to growth opportunities through the expansion of existing firms, while in countries with low entry regulation, the response is primarily through the creation of new firms; the total sectoral response is invariant to the level of regulation. Overall, our results provide a consistent body of evidence suggesting that regulation distorts the (within) structure of industry, promoting industry concentration, but does not have measurable effects on intersectoral allocations. These results favor the Public Choice view of regulation over the Public Interest view.
Economists have presented two contrasting views of government regulation of economic activity. Under the Public Choice view (Stigler (1971) , regulation is acquired by industries, and is designed and operated for their benefit, through the increased market power that regulation allows. By contrast, the Public Interest perspective, as initially suggested by Pigou (1938) , holds that industry will be fraught with inefficiencies stemming from market failures of all kinds, if left to its own devices. Regulation is therefore required to achieve socially efficient outcomes. Both perspectives suggest that entry regulation in particular will have an impact on industrial structure by directly influencing the costs of starting a new enterprise in a given industry, but differ in their views on the relative tradeoff between the correction of externalities and the creation of market power. In order to appropriately assess the extent of this tradeoff requires some empirical sense of the actual distortions that may be caused by regulatory burdens. That is the purpose of this paper.
There exists a nascent empirical literature examining the impact of entry regulation on economic outcomes. Two recent papers take contrasting approaches on this issue. Djankov, La Porta, Lopes -de-Silanes, and Shleifer 1 (2002) document significant differences across countries in the ease with which firms may open new businesses.
They go on to examine a number of country-level outcomes and find that, consistent with the Public Choice view, entry regulation is associated with higher corruption and larger unofficial economies, but not higher quality of public or private goods. Bertrand and Kramarz (2002) look in a much more focused way at the effects of entry regulation on employment of the retail sector in France, taking advantage of regional and temporal variation in the stringency with which entry regulation was applied. They find that entry regulation decreases retail employment, partly due to the increase in concentration and the ensuing price upturns.
In our paper, we take an approach that empirically straddles the two papers described above. We will take advantage of heterogeneity across industries in their natural barriers and growth opportunities to examine whether some industries are differentially affected in countries with high levels of entry regulation. This will allow us 1 Referred to as DLLS below to examine how entry regulation differentially influences industrial structure, as a function of industry characteristics, and the opportunities available to firms in that industry. This approach contrasts with DLLS, who examine the impact of regulation only at the country level -our approach will allow for the inclusion of both country and industry fixed-effects, which mitigates some conce rns of unobserved heterogeneity.
Furthermore, DLLS examine only ultimate (social) outcomes of entry regulation, rather than the direct impact upon industry structure that would be the primary consequence of regulations according to the Public Choice view (in its "acquired regulation" formulation). Also, in contrast to Bertrand and Kramarz, by considering a range of industries and countries, we are able to study the differential impact of regulation across industries, and reflect on how it varies across a much broader range of institutional structures.
Our methodology is similar to the approach popularized by Rajan and Zingales (1998) , in that we utilize U.S. data at the industry level to proxy for underlying industry characteristics that have arisen in an economy with relatively few institutional constraints. Also following the approach of Rajan and Zingales, we then examine how the relation between (underlying) industry characteristics and actual industry structure is affected by the extent of entry regulation. We report three primary sets of findings; the intuition behind each is summarized in the following paragraph.
First, we consider the effect of entry regulation on the (static) structure of industry. We find that in industries with high natural barriers to entry (and hence little need for additional barriers through regulation), entry regulation has little impact on the quantity and average size of firms in an industry. By contrast, in industries with low natural entry barriers, countries with high entry regulation have few, large firms, relative to less regulated economies. Surprisingly, there is no relation between natural entry barriers and overall industry share of manufacturing, as a function of entry regulation. Second, utilizing firm-level data, we show that operating margins are relatively high in low barrier industries in high entry regulation countries (relative to high natural barrier industries). Together, these results suggest that, while entry regulation does not distort intersectoral allocation, the within-industry organization of production is affected by the regulation of entry. We then examine the impact of entry regulation on industry dynamics, by analyzing the ability of industries to take advantage of shocks to growth opportunities. These results parallel those on static industry structure: in countries with high entry regulation, industries respond to growth opportunities through the expansion of existing firms, while in countries with low entry regulation, the response is primarily through the creation of new firms. Moreover, we find that the investment response to growth opportunities is stronger in countries with low entry regulation, when we limit the sample to richer countries. Once again, we find that the total sectoral response is invariant to the level of regulation.
Overall, our results provide a consistent body of evidence suggesting that regulation distorts the (within) structure of industry, promoting industry concentration, but does not have measurable effects on intersectoral allocations. We argue in our discussion that the results collectively favor the Public Choice view of regulation.
The rest of the paper will be structured as follows: In Section 1, we further elaborate on our methodology. Section 2 describes the datasets that we have brought together for this paper. Our main results and their interpretation are presented in Section 3, and Section 4 contains our conclusions and discussion.
Methodology

1.A. Entry Regulation and Industry Structure
Our first approach is based on the assumption that there exist industries that have 'naturally' high entry barriers. The underlying sources of these barriers are of secondary importance to our study, but may include a range of factors, such as capital intensiveness of production or technological complexity. For our main results, we will use firm turnover (defined below as entry + exit) in the United States, USTurnover i , as a proxy for industry-specific entry barriers. High turnover will be taken as a sign of relative ease of entry, i.e., turnover is negatively correlated with entry barriers. This has been suggested by Dunne and Roberts (1991) . They report high inter -industry correlations between entry and exit figures, justifying the characterization of industries with high natural entry barriers as those exhibiting relatively high entry and exit barriers. More specifically, they argue that industries can be characterized by turnover ratios as a function of industry-specific levels of sunk costs. That suggests translating (1) and (2) We predict a negative coefficient on the interaction term in (3) and a positive coefficient on the interaction term in (4). 4
1.B. Entry Regulation and Industry Margins
Now, it may be that any effect uncovered by regressions (3) and (4) may be the result of 'artificial' firm boundaries. Under this hypothesis, industry structure is identical across all levels of entry regulation in actual functioning, but there are different demarcations 'on paper' simply to avoid regulatory costs. We therefore supplement (3) and (4) with a parallel set of regressions on operating margins:
Margin ic = a i + a c + ß* USTurnover i *(Entry Regulation) c + e ic
Since high entry regulation is expected to have a greater impact on market power whenever natural barriers are low (i.e., turnover is high), we expect a positive coefficient in the interaction term in equation (5).
1.C. Entry Regulation and Response to Growth Opportunities
We now consider the dynamic effects of entry regulation. If a growth opportunity arises, entry regulation may prevent potential entrants from responding to the new opportunity.
5
For incumbents, however, the opportunity presents a chance for expansion, protected from the competitive pressures that would be present in less regulated environments.
That is, high entry regulation will promote the expansion of firm size in response to growth opportunities, whereas low entry regulation will promote an expansion in the number of firms where growth opportunities arise. We examine the existence of this differential response by looking at the interaction terms in the following specifications: opportunities, we predict ß < 0 in (6) and ß > 0 in (7). Estimating (6) and (7) we use actual growth in the United States as a proxy. The rationale is very similar to that described above: assuming that U.S. firms are in an institutional environment that allows them to optimally respond to growth opportunities, we may write:
(8)
USGrowth i = (Global Growth Opportunity) i + e iUS
That is, growth in the United States is a measure of global shocks to opportunities, plus some U.S. -specific shock e iUS . We may then simply rewrite (6) and (7) 
Data
The data on regulation of entry of start-up firms are from DLLS (2002), which contains information on the regulations of 85 countries in 1999. Our choice for the measure of entry regulation includes the entire cost incurred by a prospective firm in order to obtain legal status to operate, as a fraction of per capita GDP. As described by DLLS, it includes all identifiable official expenses, together with the monetary value of the entrepreneur's time.
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As our measure of natural entry barriers, we use firm turnover, as explained in the previous section. Following the intuition of RZ of interpreting US data as 'industry representative' of an optimal economy, we use US turnover data as our proxy for natural barriers of entry. We obtain these data from Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1988), which contains firm-level entry and exit data based on U.S. census data; we define turnover as the simple sum of entry and exit, deflated by the number of firms in the industry.
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High-income countries may be expected to have technological characteristics that are more similar to those of U.S. firms. Hence, U.S. turnover may be a better proxy for technological barriers to entry primarily for richer countries, and as a result, we may wish to restrict our analyses to wealthier countries in what follows. We construct an auxiliary dummy variable called RICH which takes on a value of 1 if the country has per capita income greater than the median of our sample and zero otherwise. This variable will be used to run some of the basic regressions in the reduced sample of more developed countries.
8
Our outcome variables are derived from the United Nations' UNIDO database, which provides data on production, value -added, number of employees, number of establishments and total wages bill, by industry, for a sample of 57 countries. We will use two country-industry specific outcome variables in our main regressions: average firm size, defined as the (log of the) ratio of industry value added to industry total number of establishments; and the (log of the) number of establishments in each industry.
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Following Rajan and Zingales (1998) 10 , we also include an industry's share of total manufacturing production as a control. Also to be consistent with earlier work, we use the industry composition utilized by RZ, which is a combination of 3-and 4-digit ISIC 6 This variable is identified as Cost + time in DLLS. 7 Dunne and Roberts (1986) provides a full description on the data construction. 8 We also used generated results using only OECD countries, which generated results very similar to those with RICH=1. When the sample is limited to OECD firms with RICH=1, the results are even stronger than those reported in the text . 9 These data is available for 52 out of the 57 countries. 10 RZ hereafter.
industries. All of the variables described in this paragraph are constructed using data from 1990.
The UNIDO data do not contain information on industry margins; to fill this gap, we utilize the World Scope Database (WSD), which provides firm-level data on public companies worldwide, representing over 96% of the world's market value. We define margins as the ratio of operating income to total sales, and generate a measure of margins at the firm level by taking averages over all available years during 1991-97. This is further collapsed to industry-country medians for some of the analyses that follow.
Finally, for our analyses on industry-level responses to growth opportunities as a function of entry regulation, we require a measure of industry-specific growth opportunities. Once again, we follow the intuition of RZ, using industry-level US sales growth as a measure of growth opportunities worldwide. As with turnover, we may be concerned that industry-specific shocks to growth opportunities will be more similar in countries at similar levels of economic development (see Fisman and Love, 2003b , for a discussion); hence, we will once again consider our results when the sample is limited to the subsample of countries with RICH = 1. The dependent variables in this section are also similar to those used by RZ, and are simply the compounded industry-level growth rates of average firm size and number of firms, as well as growth in value added, as defined above, during 1981-90.
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In following the earlier literature, we also use sector share as a control variable to be included in all regressions, defined as the ratio of industry value added generated to total manufacture value added.
Finally, we will consider the effect of other regulation on industry structure.
According to the Public Choice theory of government intervention, any regulation may indeed serve as an entry barrier, and may therefore potentially have a distortionary effect on industry structure. We use an index of labor regulation as our primary alternative measure of regulation, derived from Botero et al (2003) , which measures the level of protection of labor and employment laws, taking into account availability of alternative employment contracts, conditions of employments and job security. As a coarser, 11 The reason for dropping the year 1980 is the amount of missing observation in some of our key variables.
alternative summary measure of regulation, we use an index derived from Holmes, Johnson, and Kirkpatrick (1997) . 
Results
Before proceeding to regressions, we present some basic cross-tabulations to illustrate some patterns in the raw data. In these cross-tabs, we limit observations to countries with RICH = 1, to control in a limited way for income effects. In Table 3 , we show the data classified in high versus low turnover industries (where turnover is a proxy for natural entry barriers), and high versus low entry regulation countries. Table 3 (a) shows the total share in the number of firms for high versus low turnover industries. Not surprisingly,
given the summary statistics listed in Table 2 , a much larger number of firms are in high turnover industries. Cosinstent with our conjecture on the impact of entry regula tion, the differential between high and low turnover firms is much smaller for countries with high entry regulation. Table 3 (b) shows a similar set of results for average firm size, where we find that the gap between the size of firms in low versus high turnover industries is narrower for countries with high entry regulation. Surprisingly, average firm size is larger overall in low entry regulation countries; in our regressions,however, all countryspecific factors will be absorbed by fixed-effects, which will allow for a cleaner comparison on the differential effects of entry regulation by industry. Finally, Table 3(c)
shows that margins are indeed higher in low turnover industries, though the gap is narrower in high regulation countries. This simple cross-tabulation shows that average margins are lower in high regulation countries, but this will once again be absorbed by country-level fixed effects.
3.A. Entry Regulation and Industry Structure: Regression Results
Our estimations of equation (3) and (4) are listed in Table 4 . In columns (1) and (2) We add log(GDP)*USTurnover as a control in columns (3) and (4), and find that the size of our coefficients are reduced (in absolute values) but their significance increases to at least the 5% level. Finally, in columns (5) through (8), we restrict the sample to countries with RICH = 1, and find that for this subsample the coefficients show a stronger and more significant effect on average firm size.
In Panel B, we repeat the same set of regressions, but with Sector Share ic as the outcome variable. Interestingly, this does not generate any significant coefficients once we control for the interaction of turnover with the GDP per capita. O ur standard errors in these regressions are not increased, relative to the preceding set of regressions, suggesting that the effect of regulation does not distort total intersectoral allocations. Rather, the regulations affect industry structure through within-industry distortions.
3.B. Entry Regulation and Operating Margins: Regression Results
We present our estimation of equation (5) in Table 5 . The coefficient on the interaction term is positive, suggesting that entry regulation disproportionately ge nerates market power for firms in high-turnover industries. It is highly significant in all regressions once we either control for the interaction of GDP per capita and turnover or when the sample is limited to the subset of "rich" countries. A similar thought experiment to that described above suggests that in moving from Singapore to Peru, the gap in margins between 'high' and 'low' regulation industries increases by approximately 0.4 percentage points.
3.C. Entry Regulation and Responses to Growth Opportunities: Regression Results
To analyze the dynamic effects of entry regulation, we turn to the empirical tests described in (9) and (10), and reported in Table 6 . The full-sample regressions yield significant coefficients in the regressions examining growth in the number of establishments: there is a smaller response to growth opportunities in those countries with higher barriers to entry. The coefficients in the regressions examining average establishment size are of the predicted sign, but not significant at conventional levels.
However, when we limit the sample to countries with RICH = 1, both sets of coefficients are significant and of the predicted sign (see columns (5) and (6)).
3.D. Other Forms of Regulation
In this paper, we have focused on the specific type of regulation that we expect to most directly impact industry structure, due to the effect on the fixed cost of entry, relative to production (fixed or marginal) costs. However, our explanation could potentially apply to other types of indirect regulatory barriers to entry, which are correlated with entry regulation. We therefore wish to get a sense of whether regulation generally is distorting industrial structure by acting as a barrier to entry, or whether there is something special about regulation of entry. We therefore provide an alternative set of results that examine the impact of labor regulations, based on the data collected by Botero et al (2003) .
In Table 7 we show the results of all our main regressions. In the interests of space, we report only those regressions considering the sub-sample of rich countries and those where GDP per capita interactions have been included. Given the entry regulation results, it is remarkable that none of the interaction terms involving labor regulation are significant. We have also repeated these regressions using the overall measure of government intervention of Holmes, Johnson, and Kirkpatrick (1997) , and find that almost all coefficients are insignificant at the 10 percent level.
3.E. Robustness Checks
As Djankov et al (2003) have noted, regulation is correlated with various other countrylevel characteristics. While the most obvious control, log(GDP per capita), is included in all reported specifications, there may be concerns of other omitted variables. We therefore repeated our full set of regressions including interactions involving a number of additional covariates that might be expected to impact industry structure. First, we consider interactions with a measure of financial market development, taken from Rajan and Zingales, defined as the ratio of private domestic credit and stock market capitalization to GDP. As well, we consider the effect of including interactive controls utilizing the country-level measure of corruption developed by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobatón (2003) . Finally, we try to control for overall bureaucratic quality using a measure from Political Risk Services (1997). In no case were any of the coefficients systematically significant. Furthermore, the coefficients on the interaction terms reported above were uniformly unaffected by the inclusion of these additional interaction terms.
A second concern that affects both specifications (4) and (7) is that our measure of firm size is based on value added, which inc orporates both prices and quantities produced. To ensure that these results are not driven purely by price effects, but signify 'real' distortions, we repeat these specifications using employment-based measures of firm size, also derived from the UNIDO data. These results are reported in Table 8 , and parallel the firm size results based on firm value-added.
Conclusions
In this paper, we study the distortions to the organization of industry caused by entry regulation, taking advantage of heterogeneity across industries in their natural barriers and growth opportunities to examine whether some industries are differentially affected in countries with high levels of entry regulation. First, we consider the effect of entry regulation on the (static) structure of industry. We find that in industries with high 'natural' barriers to entry, as proxied by firm turnover in the U.S., entry regulation has little impact on the quantity and average size of firms in an industry. By contrast, in industries with low 'natural' entry barriers, countries with high entry regulation have few, large firms, relative to less regulated economies. We find no relation between 'natural' entry barriers and overall industry share of manufacturing, as a function of entry regulation. Second, utilizing firm-level data, we show that operating margins are relatively high in low barrier industries in high entry regulation countries (relative to high 'natural' barrier industries). Finally, we examine the impact of entry regulation on industry dynamics, by analyzing the ability of industries to take advantage of shocks to growth opportunities, and find that in countries with high entry regulation, industries respond to growth opportunities through the expansion of existing firms, while i n countries with low entry regulation, the response is primarily through the creation of new firms; the total sectoral response is invariant to the level of regulation. Overall, our results provide a consistent body of evidence suggesting that regulation distorts the (within) structure of industry, promoting industry concentration, but does not have measurable effects on intersectoral allocations.
It is worth noting, in conclusion, some potential policy implications of our findings. The Public Interest view does allow for the possibility that industrial organization may be distorted through the creation of regulatory entry barriers. However, the particular form of regulations that we examine here, in contrast to the regulation of labor, environmental contaminants, or product safety, do not provide obvious social returns. Therefore, the market power and distortions in industry structure that we report may not be offset by social gains. We leave further analysis on the overall welfare implications of regulation as an area for further research. 
